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Abstract
Applied researchers often combine Difference In Differences (DID) with conditioning
on pre-treatment outcomes when the Parallel Trend Assumption (PTA) fails. I ex-
amine both the theoretical and empirical basis for this approach. I show that the
theoretical argument that both methods combine their strengths – DID differenc-
ing out the permanent confounders while conditioning on pre-treatment outcomes
captures the transitory ones – is incorrect. Worse, conditioning on pre-treatment
outcomes might increase the bias of DID. Simulations of a realistic model of earnings
dynamics and selection in a Job Training Program (JTP) show that this bias can be
sizable in practice. Revisiting empirical studies comparing DID with RCTs, I also
find that conditioning on pre-treatment outcomes increases the bias of DID. Taken
together, these results suggest that we should not combine DID with conditioning
on pre-treatment outcomes but rather use DID conditioning on covariates that are
fixed over time. When the PTA fails, DID applied symmetrically around the treat-
ment date performs well in simulations and when compared with RCTs. Matching
on several observations of pre-treatment outcomes also performs well in simulations,
but evidence on its empirical performance is lacking.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the conditions under which the combination of Difference In Differences
(DID) with conditioning on pre-treatment outcomes is a valid estimator of the effect of
an intervention.1 Combining DID with conditioning on pre-treatment outcomes is often
used in empirical studies when evaluating Job Training Programs (JTPs),2 but also other
types of programs.3. This approach is especially used when the Parallel Trend Assumption
(PTA) of DID fails, that is when the pre-treatment trends in outcomes between the treated
and control groups are not parallel.
There are two informal arguments in favor of combining DID with conditioning on
pre-treatment outcomes when the PTA fails, a theoretical one and an empirical one. The
theoretical argument suggests that combining DID with conditioning on pre-treatment
outcomes combines the strengths of both methods: DID differences out the permanent
confounders while conditioning on pre-treatment outcomes captures the transitory ones.4 A
case in point is the evaluation of Job Training Programs (JTPs). Participants in JTPs have
permanently lower earnings than non-participants but also experience a transitory decrease
in earnings just before entering the program – a stylized fact known as Ashenfelter’s dip.5
Conditioning on pre-treatment outcomes captures these time varying confounders, the
argument goes, while DID differences out the permanent fixed confounders, if there are
any. The empirical argument is based on the fact that combining DID with conditioning on
pre-treatment outcomes has been found to reproduce the results of Randomized Controlled
Trials (RCTs) well, at least when evaluating the effect of JTPs on earnings (Heckman,
Ichimura, Smith, and Todd, 1998; Smith and Todd, 2005; Mueser, Troske, and Gorislavsky,
2007).
1In this paper, I only consider the case where conditioning and differencing use pre-treatment outcomes
observed at different dates. When conditioning and differencing use pre-treatment outcomes observed at
the same date, the DID estimator converges to a simple matching estimator. The question then simplifies
to whether we should use matching or DID, which is examined by Chabé-Ferret (2015).
2See e.g. Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998); Smith and Todd (2005); Mueser, Troske, and
Gorislavsky (2007)
3See e.g. Galiani, Gertler, and Schargrodsky (2005); Pufahl and Weiss (2009); Fowlie, Holland, and
Mansur (2012); Chabé-Ferret and Subervie (2013)
4See Abadie (2005) for a statement of this informal theoretical argument.
5See Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999) for a survey of the evidence on this phenomenon.
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Despite the increasing use of DID combined with conditioning on pre-treatment out-
comes in applied work, there exists no assessment of the soundness of the theoretical and
empirical arguments on which it rests. In this paper, I make a careful assessment of this
approach, both in theory and in practice. First, I build a simple model that exhibits se-
lection on both permanent and transitory confounders. I derive necessary and sufficient
conditions on the parameters of this model for the combination of DID with condition-
ing on pre-treatment outcomes to be consistent. Second, I run simulations of a model of
earnings dynamics and self-selection into a JTP in order to assess the size of the bias in
a realistic application. Third, I revisit experimental estimates of the performance of DID
conditioning on pre-treatment outcomes in order to compare them with the predictions
from my model.
In my simulations, I focus on the example of the effect of JTPs on earnings for several
reasons. First, JTPs are crucial components of the modern welfare state, especially in
a context in which innovations and trade disrupt entire sectors in developed countries
and require the retooling of millions of workers. Second, earnings are the main outcome
that a JTP seeks to influence, especially by increasing the human capital of workers.
Third, earnings dynamics are described extensively by some well-known processes whose
parameters have been estimated in labor economics. Fourth, both observational methods
and RCTs have been and still are extensively used to evaluate JTPs. Fifth, empirical
results comparing the bias of observational methods to an experimental benchmark are
available for the effect of JTPs on earnings and their results can be contrasted with the
predictions of the model.
The main result of this paper is that both the theoretical and the empirical arguments
in favor of combining DID with conditioning on pre-treatment outcomes are incorrect. My
main theoretical result shows that there is no configuration in which the combination of
DID with conditioning on pre-treatment outcomes is consistent in a model that exhibits
selection on both permanent and transitory confounders. The only configurations where
the combination of DID with conditioning on pre-treatment outcomes is consistent is when
there is either no selection on a fixed confounder – and matching conditioning on pre-
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treatment outcomes is consistent – or no selection on transitory ones – and DID without
conditioning on pre-treatment outcomes is consistent. The intuition for this result is that
conditioning on pre-treatment outcomes generates time varying selection bias while the
validity of DID is predicated upon the assumption that selection bias is constant over
time.
Worse, I find two cases where combining DID with conditioning on pre-treatment out-
comes can generate bias for an otherwise consistent DID estimator. These are, to my
knowledge, the first concrete examples of the fallacy of alignment, a term coined by Heck-
man and Navarro-Lozano (2004) to describe situations where conditioning on observed co-
variates might actually increase the bias of an estimator. The first instance of the fallacy of
alignment in my results appears when selection is only due to permanent confounders and
transitory shocks are persistent. In that case, DID without conditioning on pre-treatment
outcomes is consistent but DID conditioning on pre-treatment outcomes is not. The sec-
ond theoretical instance of the fallacy of alignment appears when selection is due to both
permanent and transitory confounders. In that case, under conditions made precise in
Chabé-Ferret (2015),6 selection bias is symmetric around the treatment date and DID
applied symmetrically around the treatment date without conditioning on pre-treatment
outcomes is consistent. Under these conditions, conditioning on pre-treatment outcomes
generates bias for the DID estimator. The intuition for this result is that conditioning on
pre-treatment outcomes breaks the symmetry of selection bias around the treatment date.
Although interesting, these results are mainly theoretical. It is possible that the bias of
DID combined with conditioning on pre-treatment outcomes is small in actual applications
and that this approach, although theoretically inconsistent, is approximately valid. This
might explain why it has been found to reproduce the results of RCTs very well in the case
of JTPs. I use a model of self-selection and earnings dynamics calibrated with realistic
parameter values taken from the literature to gauge how the the bias of DID varies as we
condition on pre-treatment outcomes. There are two main results from the simulations.
6These conditions are that the agents have full information on transitory shocks when they select into
the treatment, that transitory shocks are stationary and that the conditional expectation of transitory
shocks conditional on the net utility of entering the program is linear.
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First, when the conditions for selection bias to be symmetric are fulfilled, the bias of DID
conditioning on one pre-treatment outcome is sizable: it is in absolute value of the order
of magnitude of the treatment effects of JTPs usually found with RCTs. The bias of
combining DID with conditioning on one observation of pre-treatment outcomes is thus
large enough to mask the effects of most JTPs. Second, even when selection bias is not
symmetric around the treatment date, the bias of DID conditioning on one pre-treatment
outcome is still generally larger in absolute value than the bias of DID not conditioning
on pre-treatment outcomes and applied symmetrically around the treatment date.
Both the theoretical and simulation results suggest that combining DID with condi-
tioning on one observation of pre-treatment outcomes might not be the reason why DID
matching performs so well at reproducing the results of RCTs. Both results suggest that
it is rather DID applied symmetrically around the treatment date not conditioning on pre-
treatment outcomes that might be the reason for the good performance of DID matching
against RCTs. In order to check these predictions, I take a closer look at the original stud-
ies comparing DID matching with RCTs: Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998) and
Smith and Todd (2005).7 I separate the estimates depending on whether they condition or
not on pre-treatment outcomes and whether or not they are applied symmetrically around
the treatment date. In both papers, I find that it is the application of DID symmetri-
cally around the treatment date rather than the combination of DID with conditioning on
pre-treatment outcomes that performs well, in agreement with both my theoretical and
simulation results.
Taken together, these results suggest that we should not combine DID with conditioning
on pre-treatment outcomes. Indeed, not only do the theoretical and empirical arguments
in favor of this approach not hold, but there are theoretical and empirical arguments
suggesting that conditioning on pre-treatment outcomes might increase the bias of DID.
What to do then when the PTA does not hold and what we thought was a silver bullet
– combining DID with conditioning on pre-treatment outcomes – actually does not work?
7I do not include Mueser, Troske, and Gorislavsky (2007) in this analysis since this paper compares the
observational estimates to experimental estimates on a different out-of-state population, thereby suggesting
that differences between both approaches might stem from differences in populations.
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Results in this paper suggest two possible approaches. First, DID applied symmetrically
around the treatment date performs well in simulations and when compared with RCTs
when estimating the effect of JTPs on earnings. Second, matching on several observations
of pre-treatment outcomes performs well in simulations, but evidence on its empirical
performance is lacking.
The approach of using a model of outcome dynamics and selection in a program to study
the properties of observational estimators is rooted in an ancient literature. Ashenfelter
(1978) formalizes the evaluation problem as a combination of selection on a fixed effect and
on transitory shocks. Heckman (1978), Heckman and Robb (1985) and Ashenfelter and
Card (1985) combine the selection equation with the outcome dynamics equation and in-
troduce DID applied symmetrically around the treatment date. Bassi (1984) acknowledges
that combining differencing with conditioning on pre-treatment changes in outcomes suf-
fers from Nickell (1981)’s problem: pre-treatment changes in outcomes are correlated with
transitory shocks. LaLonde (1986) tests whether observational estimators, among them
DID combined with conditioning on pre-treatment outcomes, reproduce the results of an
RCT. Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997), Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998)
introduce the DID matching estimator. Abadie (2005) develops the informal theoretical
argument in favor of combining DID with conditioning on pre-treatment outcomes and in-
troduces a new DID matching estimator. Heckman and Navarro-Lozano (2004) show that
the bias of matching might increase when conditional on additional covariates and coin the
term “fallacy of alignment.” Chabé-Ferret (2015) studies the bias of matching condition-
ing on pre-treatment outcome and of DID not conditioning on pre-treatment outcomes but
does not study the combination of DID with conditioning on pre-treatment outcomes. He
derives sufficient conditions for the estimators to be consistent in a model similar to the
one in this paper, but does not derive necessary and sufficient conditions as in this paper.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical results on when
DID conditioning on one observation of pre-treatment outcomes is consistent; Section 3
presents the results of simulations of a model of earnings dynamics and selection in a JTP
calibrated with realistic parameter values; Section 4 summarizes evidence from comparisons
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of observational methods to an experimental benchmark. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical results
In this section, I formally derive theoretical results for the consistency of DID conditioning
on one observation of pre-treatment outcomes in a simple model exhibiting selection both
on a fixed effect and on transitory shocks. I also derive instances where conditioning on
pre-treatment outcomes generates bias for an otherwise consistent DID estimator. I first
present the model and then the main theoretical results.
Setting
The outcomes in the absence of the treatment depend on time and individual fixed effects
and on transitory shocks (Equation (1a)). Transitory shocks are persistent: they follow an
AR(1) process with |ρ| < 1 (Equation (1b)).
Y 0i,t = δt + µi + Uit (1a)
with Ui,t = ρUi,t−1 + vi,t (1b)
Di,k = 1[t ≥ k]1[θi + γYi,k−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
D∗
i,k
≥ 0]. (1c)
Treatment is offered at period k. Selection into the program depends on an individual
fixed effect θi and on outcomes at date k− 1 (Equation (1c)). The two critical parameters
for selection are γ and ρθ,µ (the correlation of the fixed effect µi with the unobserved shifter
of participation θi). When γ = 0, selection is due to the fixed effect only. When ρθ,µ = 0,
selection is on the observed pre-treatment outcome Yi,k−1 only.
I make the following assumptions: σ2 > 0, σ2U0 > 0, σ2µ > 0, σ2θ > 0. vi,t are i.i.d.
mean-zero shocks with finite variance σ2 and Ui,0 is a mean-zero shock with variance
σ2U0 . vi,t ⊥ (µi, θi),∀t and Ui,0 ⊥ (µi, θi, vi,t),∀t. I finally assume that the conditional
expectations E[Y 0i,k+τ |D∗i,k] and E[Y 0i,k+τ |D∗i,k, Yk−1] are linear. This assumption simplifies a
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lot the analysis of the biases. It holds for example when all the error terms are normal.
Although admittedly very simple, the model described by equation (1) has several
virtues. First, it encapsulates in the simplest possible setting the problem that combining
DID with conditioning on pre-treatment outcomes is trying to solve: selection on a fixed
effect and on transitory shocks. Second, this model also accounts for various types of
realistic selection processes: namely self-selection in a JTP and a cutoff eligibility rule.
Assuming no idiosyncratic trend, no MA terms and limited information, setting γ = −ρ
and θi = αir −ci, the model of earnings dynamics and entry into a JTP presented in Section 3
simplifies to the model described by Equation (1). As argued in Chabé-Ferret (2015), a
program allocated when a running variable falls below some eligibility threshold can also
be described by Equation (1c). In that case, γ = −1 and θi accounts for measurement
error in the variable determining eligibility.
I study the asymptotic bias of three estimators of the average effect of the treatment
on the treated (ATT) on outcomes observed τ periods after the treatment date: matching
(M), DID and DID matching conditioning on one observation of pre-treatment outcomes
(DIDM).
B(Mk,τ,1) = E[E[Y 0i,k+τ |Di,k = 1, Yi,k−1]− E[Y 0i,k+τ |Di,k = 0, Yi,k−1]|Di,k = 1] (2a)
B(DIDk,τ,τ ′) = E[Y 0i,k+τ − Y 0i,k−τ ′ |Di,k = 1]− E[Y 0i,k+τ − Y 0i,k−τ ′|Di,k = 0] (2b)
B(DIDMk,τ,1,τ ′) = E
[
E[Y 0i,k+τ − Y 0i,k−τ ′|Di,k = 1, Yi,k−1]
− E[Y 0i,k+τ − Y 0i,k−τ ′ |Di,k = 0, Yi,k−1]|Di,k = 1
]
. (2c)
The matching estimator compares the expected outcomes of the treated τ periods after
the treatment to those of the untreated conditional on Yi,k−1. Yi,k−1 is the last pre-treatment
outcome observed before the treatment is taken and intuitively the one containing the
most relevant information for selection. The bias of matching is the expected difference in
potential outcomes in the absence of the treatment between the treated and the untreated
groups, conditional on Yi,k−1, integrated over the distribution of Yi,k−1 conditional onDi,k =
1 (Equation (2a)).
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The DID estimator compares the change in outcomes over time in the treated group
to the change in outcomes over time in the untreated group. The change over time is
computed by comparing outcomes τ periods after the treatment to outcomes τ ′ periods
before the treatment. The bias of DID is equal to the difference in the change over time in
potential outcomes in the absence of the treatment between the treated and the untreated
groups (Equation (2b)).
The DIDM estimator compares the change in outcomes over time in the treated group
to the change in outcomes over time in the untreated group conditional on Yi,k−1. The
bias of DIDM is equal to the difference in the change over time in potential outcomes in
the absence of the treatment between the treated and the untreated groups conditional on
Yi,k−1, integrated over the distribution of Yi,k−1 conditional on Di,k = 1 (Equation (2c)).
Basic results
In this section, I derive necessary and sufficient conditions for M, DID and DIDM to be
consistent in the model defined by Equation (1). As I want to state general results on the
model parameters for each of the estimators to be consistent, I have to define the sets of
periods k, τ and τ ′ for which I want the biases of the various estimators to cancel. The usual
practice is to use these estimators without restricting their validity to any particular subset
of the possible treatment dates (k) or lag between treatment and observation of outcomes
(τ). Thus, I will define consistency in this model as requiring that the estimators are valid
for all k > 0 and for all τ ≥ 0. Similarly, for DID and DIDM, I define consistency as the
fact that the bias of the estimator is zero regardless of the pre-treatment period k−τ ′ used
to construct the estimator, with τ ′ > 1.8
Theorem 1 is the main result of this section. It shows that the intuitive story that
combining DID with conditioning on pre-treatment outcomes combines their strengths –
DID differencing out the fixed effect and conditioning on pre-treatment outcomes capturing
the transitory shocks – is wrong. Indeed, Theorem 1 shows that there is no configuration of
the parameter space such that the combination of DID with conditioning on pre-treatment
8I do not include the case where τ ′ = 1 since B(DIDMk,τ,1,1) = B(Mk,τ,1) by construction.
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outcomes is consistent, apart from when either ρθ,µ = 0 (and there is no selection on the
fixed effect) or ρ = 0 (and there is no selection bias due to transitory shocks). Theorem 1
also means that combining DID with conditioning on one observation of pre-treatment
outcomes does not add any identifying power to simple matching and simple DID: it is
consistent only if one of them also is. Worse, Theorem 1 also implies that there are
instances (γ = 0 and ρ 6= 0) when DID not conditioning on pre-treatment outcomes is
consistent while DID conditioning on one observation of pre-treatment outcomes is not.
This is an instance of the fallacy of alignment, where conditioning on observed covariates
actually increases the bias of an otherwise consistent estimator.
Theorem 1 (Consistency of M, DID and DIDM) The following three statements hold
in the model defined in Equation (1):
(i) ∀k > 0, ∀τ ≥ 0, B(Mk,τ,1) = 0 ⇔ ρθ,µ = 0
(ii) ∀k > 0, ∀τ ≥ 0, ∀τ ′ > 1, B(DIDk,τ,τ ′) = 0 ⇔ γ = 0 or ρ = 0
(iii) ∀k > 0, ∀τ ≥ 0, ∀τ ′ > 1, B(DIDMk,τ,1,τ ′) = 0 ⇔ ρθ,µ = 0 or ρ = 0
Proof: see Section A in the Appendix.
Part (i) of Theorem 1 shows that matching is consistent if and only if there is no
selection on the fixed effect. Part (ii) of Theorem 1 shows that DID not conditioning on
pre-treatment outcomes is consistent if and only if there is either no selection on transitory
shocks or transitory shocks are not persistent. Part (iii) of Theorem 1 shows that combining
DID with conditioning on pre-treatment outcomes is consistent if and only if either there
is no selection on the fixed effect or temporary shocks are not persistent.
The intuition for Theorem 1 is that conditioning on pre-treatment outcomes generates
time varying selection bias while the validity of DID is predicated upon the assumption
that selection bias is constant over time. The only settings in which conditioning on
pre-treatment outcomes generates selection bias that is constant over time is either when
selection bias after conditioning is zero, and thus simple conditioning is also consistent or
when temporary shocks are not auto-correlated, in which case simple DID is also consistent.
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Figure 1 illustrates the results of Theorem 1. It shows the results of simulations of
the model described in equation 1 using the formulae derived in Chabé-Ferret (2015)’s
Appendix B. Figure 1 shows the expected value of the outcomes in the absence of the
treatment around the treatment date for the treated (circles), the untreated (crosses) and
the matched untreated (triangles), i.e. the untreated with the same distribution of Yi,k−1
as the treated. The difference between treated and untreated measures selection bias. The
difference between treated and matched untreated measures the bias of matching. The
difference between the bias of matching before and after the treatment date measures the
bias of DID matching.
In Figure 1(a), selection is on transitory shocks only (ρθ,µ = 0). As expected from
part (i) of Theorem 1, simple matching is consistent since treated and matched untreated
are aligned at every period after the treatment date: the matched untreated perfectly
proxy for the counterfactual outcomes of the treated. DID conditioning on one observation
of pre-treatment outcomes is consistent when matching is consistent since pre-treatment
outcomes are also aligned before period k − 1, despite the fact that they have not been
explicitly conditioned on. This is because Yi,k−1 is a sufficient statistics for selection in
that case.
In Figure 1(b), selection is on the fixed effect only (γ = 0) and transitory shocks are
not persistent (ρ = 0). As expected from part (ii) of Theorem 1, DID not conditioning
on pre-treatment outcomes is consistent as selection bias is constant over time. DID
conditioning on one observation of pre-treatment outcomes is also consistent, because
the bias of matching is constant over time, except at period k − 1 where it is zero by
construction.
Figure 1(c) illustrates the main result of Theorem 1: contrary to the intuitive idea
that they combine their strengths, combining DID with conditioning on pre-treatment
outcomes does not get rid of selection bias when it is due to both a fixed effect and
transitory shocks. Indeed, Figure 1(c) selection is both on the fixed effect and on transitory
shocks. As expected from Theorem 1, simple matching is biased, which is apparent because
treated and matched untreated are not perfectly aligned after the treatment date. DID not
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conditioning on pre-treatment outcomes is also biased since selection bias varies over time.
DID conditioning on one observation of pre-treatment outcomes is also biased because the
difference between treated and matched untreated varies over time.
Figure 1(d) illustrates one instance of the fallacy of alignment. In Figure 1(d), selection
is on the fixed effect only (γ = 0) and thus DID is consistent. Selection bias is constant over
time in that case and the difference between treated and untreated at any pre-treatment
date is a consistent proxy for post-treatment selection bias. Unlike in Figure 1(b), though,
transitory shocks are persistent (ρ 6= 0), the bias of simple matching is not constant
over time, and thus DID conditioning on one observation of pre-treatment outcomes is
inconsistent.
Results under full information
In the selection model under full information studied by Chabé-Ferret (2015), DID applied
symmetrically around the treatment date is consistent while DID conditioning on pre-
treatment outcomes is not, as Theorem 2 shows. In this model, agents select into the
program based on their outcomes at period k. It is the case for example if agents anticipate
their future earnings shocks (bonus decrease, layoff, etc) and decide to enter a JTP as a
consequence. In the selection model under full information, the selection Equation (1c) is
replaced by:
Dfi,k = 1[t ≥ k]1[θfi + γfY 0i,k︸ ︷︷ ︸
D∗f
i,k
≥ 0]. (3)
Theorem 2 In the model under full information (where Equation (3) substitutes for Equa-
tion (1c)), the following two statements hold when σ2U0 =
σ2
1−ρ2 :
(i) ∀k > 0, ∀τ > 0, B(DIDk,τ,τ ) = 0,
(ii) ∀k > 0, ∀τ > 0, B(DIDMk,τ,1,τ ) 6= 0 except if aσµ = −γfρ(σ2µ + σ
2
1−ρ2 ).
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Proof: see Section A in the Appendix.
Theorem 2 shows that when the outcome process is stationary,9 DID applied symmetri-
cally around the treatment date not conditioning on pre-treatment outcomes is consistent
while combining DID with conditioning on one observation of pre-treatment outcomes is
not. The result in Theorem 2 is important since it shows that there exists an estimator
that is consistent even when there is selection both on a fixed effect and on transitory
shocks. Figure 1(e) illustrates this case: selection bias forms and dissipates at the same
pace and is thus symmetric around the treatment date k. Conditioning on Yi,k−1 breaks the
symmetry of the dip and renders DID inconsistent. On Figure 1(e), the bias of matching
decreases as it gets closer to k − 1, increases sharply at date k because of the last shock
before selection (vi,k), and decreases thereafter. DID conditioning on Yi,k and applied sym-
metrically around the treatment date would be consistent, but it is infeasible since the
potential outcomes of the participants are unobserved.
3 Simulation results
In this section, I use simulations a model of earnings dynamics and selection into a JTP
calibrated with realistic parameter values in order to gauge the likely size of the bias of
DID conditioning on pre-treatment outcomes and how it compares with DID and matching
in real applications.
The model used in the simulations combines an equation for earnings dynamics and a
selection equation (see Chabé-Ferret (2015) for a detailed discussion of this model). The
process for the log-earnings of individual i at time t in the absence of the treatment (Y 0i,t)
9Because σ2U0 is equal to its long run value of
σ2
1−ρ2 .
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has the following form:
Y 0i,t = a+ b
18 + t
10 + c
(18 + t
10
)2
+ (δ + rtd)Ei + µi + βit+ Uit (4a)
with Ui,t = ρUi,t−1 +m1vi,t−1 +m2vi,t−2 + vi,t (4b)
vi,t i.i.d. mean-zero shocks with finite variance σ2, (4c)
vi,t ⊥ (Ei, βi, µi),∀t, (4d)
(Ui,0, vi,0, vi,−1) mean-zero shocks with covariance matrix Σ0, (4e)
(Ui,0, vi,0, vi,−1) ⊥ (Ei, βi, µi, vi,t),∀t. (4f)
The main parameters used to calibrate the model are presented in Table 1, while the
full list of parameter values is presented in Table 2 in Appendix B. This model encapsulates
Table 1 – Parameters values used for the earnings process
RIP HIP
(MaCurdy, 1982) (Guvenen, 2007, 2009)
ρ 0.99 0.821
m1 -0.4 0
m2 -0.1 0
σ2 0.055 0.055
σ2µ 0 0.022
σ2β 0 0.00038
σµ,β 0 -0.002
Note: σ2µ (resp. σ2β) is the variance of µi (resp. βi).
σµ,β is the covariance between µi and βi. The values
of the parameters of the yearly earnings process come
from MaCurdy (1982) and Guvenen (2007, 2009). The
only exception is the estimate of σ2 in the HIP: for sim-
plicity, it is set to the same value as the one estimated
by MaCurdy (1982). Guvenen (2007, 2009) estimates
the HIP model with a measurement error term on top
of the AR(1) component. The sum of the variances of
these two shocks is of the same order of magnitude as
σ2 estimated by MaCurdy (1982).
the two leading views on the process of earnings dynamics: the Restricted Income Profile
(RIP) and the Heterogeneous Income Profile (HIP).
The equation for modeling the net utility of entering a JTP at period k has the following
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shape:
D∗ιi,k =
αi
r
− ci,k − E[Y 0i,k|Iιi,k], (5)
ci,k = ci + βxEi −
a+ b18 + k10 + c
(
18 + k
10
)2
+ (δ + rkd)Ei
 (6)
D∗ιi,k has three components. The first part is the discounted gains from entering the pro-
gram. The second part is the direct cost of participation to the program ci,k. The third
part is the opportunity cost of entering the program (expected foregone earnings). ci,k has
itself two parts. The first part is composed of administrative costs which depend partly
on education (ci + βxEi). The second part is income support from the government that is
equal to experience and education rated average earnings. Iιi,k denotes agents’ information
set when computing the expected foregone earnings. I consider three distinct assumptions
on Iιi,k:
Full information: Ifi,k =
{
Xi, αi, ci, µi, βi, {δj}kj=1 , {vi,j}kj=1
}
. Agents know all the shocks
up to period k and can perfectly forecast their foregone earnings (E[Y 0i,k|Ifi,k] = Y 0i,k).
Limited information: I li,k =
{
Xi, αi, ci, µi, βi, {δj}kj=1 , {vi,j}k−1j=1
}
. Agents do not know
the last idiosyncratic shock to their earnings.10 Limited information can arise because
agents have to decide whether or not to enter the program at the end of period k− 1
before observing the change to their earnings that occurs at period k. Their expected
foregone earnings are E[Y 0i,k|I li,k] = Y 0i,k − vi,k.
Bayesian updating: Ibi,k =
{
Ei, αi, ci, µ
o
i , β
o
i , {δj}kj=1 , {Yi,j}k−1j=1
}
. In this setup, the id-
iosyncratic intercept and slope terms are the sum of two components: µi = µoi + µui
and βi = βoi + βui . Agents observe {µoi , βoi } at period 0 but have no information on
{µui , βui , Ui,0}. They thus start with a prior on {µi, βi, Ui,0} centered at {µoi , βoi , 0}.
They then observe Yi,1, Ei and δ1 and use Kalman filtering to form a posterior on
{µi, βi, Ui,1}. Expected foregone earnings at period k (E[Y 0i,k|Ibi,k]) are formed us-
10Note that agents know the shock to the overall economy δk. This is for comparability with the full
information case.
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ing the posterior distribution of {µi, βi, Ui,k} given Ibi,k (see Chabé-Ferret (2015)’s
Appendix C for a complete description).
Figure 2 presents the results of three simulations that are representative of the overall
behavior of the estimators under various configurations of the model presented just above.
Additional simulation results can be found in Appendix C.
The main results out of the simulations are the following. First, DID applied symmet-
rically around the treatment date not conditioning on pre-treatment outcomes is generally
less biased than DID combined with conditioning on one observation of pre-treatment
outcomes. DID applied symmetrically around the treatment date not conditioning on
pre-treatment outcomes is also generally less biased than matching on one observation of
pre-treatment outcomes. Second, DID applied symmetrically around the treatment date
not conditioning on pre-treatment outcomes is generally more biased than by DID condi-
tioning on three observations of pre-treatment outcomes. Third, DID and matching are
close to each other when conditioning on three observations of pre-treatment outcomes.
Figure 2(a) shows that DID applied symmetrically around the treatment date not
conditioning on pre-treatment outcomes is consistent when selection bias is symmetric
around the treatment date, as expected from Theorem 2. Figure 2(a) also shows that the
bias of combining DID with conditioning on one observation of pre-treatment outcomes is
roughly equal to -0.06, which is in absolute value in the ballpark of the estimates of the
causal effects of JTPs on (log-)earnings. The bias of combining DID with conditioning
on one observation of pre-treatment outcomes is thus in this case large enough to mask
the effects of most JTPs. Two additional results are noteworthy on Figure 2(a). The
bias of matching on a single observation of pre-treatment outcomes is much larger than
that of DID with the same conditioning set, so that differencing does bring something
in that configuration. This is because the bias of matching before the treatment date is
of the same sign as and of half the size of the bias of matching after the treatment date
(see Figure 1(e)). Also, conditioning on additional observations of pre-treatment outcomes
makes DID and matching more similar.
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Figure 2(b) shows the results of simulations where selection bias is not symmetric
around the treatment date. This is due to a combination of two phenomena: first, agents
have limited information, in that they do not know the last shock to their earnings when
deciding to enter the treatment; and second, the earnings process is not stationary, since
it starts with a very small variance for the initial shock. An asymmetric selection bias
generates bias for the DID estimator applied symmetrically around the treatment date not
conditioning on pre-treatment outcomes. The size of the bias decreases in absolute value
as individuals gain experience and the variance of the shocks increases. The DID estima-
tor applied symmetrically around the treatment date not conditioning on pre-treatment
outcomes does pretty well after the middle of the career, and actually better than the
alternatives in terms of MSE. Figure 2(b) also shows that conditioning on additional ob-
servations of pre-treatment outcomes improves both DID and matching and makes them
closer to each other and more stable along the life-cycle. Conditional on three observations
of pre-treatment outcomes, DID and matching perform as well as DID applied symmetri-
cally around the treatment date not conditioning on pre-treatment outcomes late in the
life-cycle and better early in the life-cycle.
Figure 2(c) shows the results of a simulation of the HIP model with Bayesian learning
and initial conditions for the Ui,t process different from the long run ones, where selec-
tion bias is also asymmetric around the treatment date. We can see the same features
as in the previous configuration: DID applied symmetrically around the treatment date
not conditioning on pre-treatment outcomes dominates both matching and DID match-
ing conditioning on one observation of pre-treatment outcomes, but is dominated by DID
and matching conditioning on three observations of pre-treatment outcomes. Additionally,
both DID matching and matching conditioning on three observations of pre-treatment
outcomes are close to each other.
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4 Revisiting experimental estimates
This section revisits the results of Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998) and Smith
and Todd (2005), that compare DID and matching to an experimental benchmark.11 Fol-
lowing the approach initiated by LaLonde (1986), these studies compare experimental esti-
mates of the effects of JTPs stemming from RCTs to observational estimates of the effects
of the same program, using as much as possible the same data. These studies have found
that DID matching is the method that reproduces best the results of RCTs. Revisiting
the results of these studies in detail, I find support for the main prediction from Section 3:
DID applied symmetrically around the treatment date not conditioning on pre-treatment
outcomes performs better at reproducing the experimental results than DID conditioning
on one observation of pre-treatment outcomes. Figure 3 summarizes the main results of
these two studies.
Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998) compare nonexperimental estimates of
the effect of the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) obtained with matching and DID
matching to the experimental benchmark, making use of the random allocation of the
program. They implement DID symmetrically around the treatment date. They vary
the set of control variables when assessing the performance of DID matching. Heckman,
Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998)’s results suggest that conditioning on pre-treatment
earnings increases the bias of DID. With a coarse set of predictors (only variables that
are constant over time like age, schooling and marital status), the bias of DID applied
symmetrically around the treatment date is equal to 73% of the experimental treatment
effect. When conditioning on one observation of pre-treatment earnings (model PII), the
bias of DID applied symmetrically around the treatment date increases and equals 332%
of the treatment effect.
11Mueser, Troske, and Gorislavsky (2007) provide a similar analysis but their experimental benchmark
stems from a different population and thus differences between the estimates might be due to differences
in populations. Mueser, Troske, and Gorislavsky (2007) nevertheless provide two results that are in line
with the results in this paper. First, combining DID and conditioning on pre-treatment outcomes is
less biased than matching on pre-treatment outcomes, a result apparent in Figure 2(a). Second, DID
applied symmetrically around the treatment date without conditioning on pre-treatment outcomes is in
the ballpark of the experimental estimate.
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Smith and Todd (2005) compare the ability of matching and DID matching to reproduce
the results of the famous National Supported Work (NSW) experiment already analyzed
by LaLonde (1986). They apply DID roughly symmetrically around the treatment date,
since the outcomes are measured in 1975 and 1978, and the treatment is allocated between
1976 and 1977. They vary the set of control variables when assessing the performances of
matching and DID matching. Smith and Todd (2005)’s results show again that condition-
ing on pre-treatment earnings increases the bias of DID. With a coarse set of controls not
including pre-treatment outcomes, the bias of DID matching is of 22% of the experimental
treatment effect, with the smaller (and most efficient) bandwidth. On the same sample,
the bias of DID matching conditioning on pre-treatment outcomes is of -137%.
Figure 3 – Empirical estimates of the absolute value of the bias of matching and
DID relative to RCTs for two JTPs
0%
50%
100%
150%
200%
250%
300%
350%
400%
450%
Matching on pre-treat.
Outcomes
Sym. DID Matching on pre-
treat. Outcomes
Sym. DID Matching not on
pre-treat. Outcomes
Bias (% of the treatment effect) 
HIST ST
Note: the figure presents the bias of various observational estimators esti-
mated relative to an experimental estimate obtained using randomly allocated
JTPs. HIST stand for Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998) and ST
for Smith and Todd (2005). The results of the bias of Matching and DID
Matching from HIST are from their Table XIII on p.1062. The coarse set
of predictors does not condition on pre-treatment earnings while the set PII
does. The results of the bias of Matching from ST are from their Table 5 p.336
and the bias of DID Matching is from their Table 6 p.340. The LaLonde set
of predictors does not contain pre-treatment earnings while the DW set does.
The sample is the full LaLonde sample. The Matching estimator used for the
comparisons is the local linear Matching with a small bandwidth (1.0).
It is more difficult to find support for the prediction that conditioning on additional
observations of pre-treatment outcomes reduces the bias of DID matching, and dominates
DID not conditioning on pre-treatment outcomes. Indeed, to my knowledge, most available
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studies comparing RCTs to DID matching do not have several observations of pre-treatment
outcomes or do not use them. Dehejia and Wahba (2002) find that matching on two
observations of pre-treatment earnings has a negligible bias relative to an experimental
estimate. Smith and Todd (2005) criticize this result on the grounds that the second
observation of pre-treatment earnings is only available for a very specific subgroup and
that selection bias on this specific subgroup is actually zero without conditioning on any
covariate. Andersson, Holzer, Lane, Rosenblum, and Smith (2013) do not directly test the
prediction but find that adding more observations than two years of pre-treatment earnings
does not change the matching estimator much.
5 Conclusion
Taken together, the results presented in this paper cast doubt on the theoretical and em-
pirical arguments in favor of combining DID with conditioning on pre-treatment outcomes
when estimating the effect of an intervention. Indeed, the intuitive story that DID and
conditioning on pre-treatment outcomes combine their strengths – DID differencing out
the fixed effect and conditioning on pre-treatment outcomes capturing transitory shocks –
is not valid theoretically. Worse, there are cases in which conditioning on pre-treatment
outcomes actually generates bias for an otherwise consistent DID estimator, an instance of
Heckman and Navarro-Lozano (2004)’s fallacy of alignment. It is especially the case when
DID is applied symmetrically around the treatment date: under certain conditions, this
estimator is consistent not conditioning on pre-treatment outcomes even when there is se-
lection both on a fixed effect and on transitory shocks, while it is biased when conditioning
on pre-treatment outcomes.
When estimating the effect of a JTP on earnings, the results presented in this paper
suggest to use DID applied symmetrically around the treatment date not conditioning
on pre-treatment outcomes when a few observations of pre-treatment outcomes are avail-
able and to use matching conditioning on all available pre-treatment earnings when there
are at least three observations of pre-treatment outcomes. In simulations of a model of
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earnings and self-selection in a JTP, the bias of DID conditioning on one observation of
pre-treatment outcomes is indeed sizable (of the order of magnitude of treatment effects
usually estimated in the literature) and DID applied symmetrically around the treatment
date performs better even when it is not consistent. Results of studies comparing observa-
tional estimators to an experimental benchmark confirm that the bias of DID conditioning
on one observation of pre-treatment outcomes is actually higher than the bias of DID
applied symmetrically around the treatment date not conditioning on pre-treatment out-
comes. When conditioning on three observations of pre-treatment outcomes, simulations
show that matching and DID matching are actually very close and dominate DID applied
symmetrically around the treatment date not conditioning on pre-treatment outcomes.
Unfortunately, to my knowledge, there is no empirical result testing that prediction.
The results in this paper also cast doubt on the practice of combining DID with condi-
tioning on pre-treatment outcomes in applications other than the evaluation of the effect
of JTPs on earnings. Indeed, this paper shows that there is no sound theoretical basis for
combining DID with conditioning on pre-treatment outcomes. When few observations on
pre-treatment outcomes are available, I would advise for using DID without conditioning
on pre-treatment outcomes and, if possible, applied symmetrically around the treatment
date. When several observations of pre-treatment outcomes are available, I would advise
for conditioning on all of them non-parametrically, using matching. In order to strengthen
these suggestions, we are in dire need of simulations and of experimental results gauging
the bias of observational methods for interventions other than JTPs.
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A Proofs
I use σA,B to denote the covariance between random variables Ai and Bi and σ2A for the
variance of Ai.
Lemma 1 ∀k > 0, ∀τ ≥ 0, B(Mk,τ,1) = 0 ⇔ numk,τ = 0, with numk,τ = σYk+τ ,D∗kσ2Yk−1 −
σYk−1,D∗kσYk−1,Yk+τ .
Proof: By linearity of conditional expectations:
E[Y 0i,k+τ |D∗i,k, Yk−1] = E[Y 0i,t] + θY 0k+τ ,D∗k
(
D∗i,k − E[D∗i,k]
)
+ θY 0
k+τ ,Y
0
k−1
(
Y 0i,k−1 − E[Y 0i,k−1]
)
,
with θY 0
k+τ ,D
∗
k
= numk,τ
σ2
D∗
k
σ2Yk−1−σ
2
Yk−1,D∗k
. As a consequence,
B(Mk,τ,1) = θY 0
k+τ ,D
∗
k
E[E[D∗i,k|Di,k = 1, Yk−1]− E[D∗i,k|Di,k = 0, Yk−1]|Di,k = 1].
The result follows because E[D∗i,k|Di,k = 1, Yk−1]−E[D∗i,k|Di,k = 0, Yk−1] > 0 and σ2D∗
k
σ2Yk−1−
σ2Yk−1,D∗k > 0.
Lemma 2 ∀k > 0, ∀τ ≥ 0, numk,τ = σ2Uk−1σµa(1−ρτ+1), with a = ρθ,µσθ and b = a+γσµ.
Proof:
numk,τ =
[
bσµ + γρτ+1σ2Uk−1
] [
σ2µ + σ2Uk−1
]
−
[
bσµ + γσ2Uk−1
] [
σ2µ + ρτ+1σ2Uk−1
]
= γρτ+1σ4Uk−1 − γρτ+1σ4Uk−1
+ σ2Uk−1
[
γρτ+1σ2µ + bσµ − bσµρτ+1 − γσ2µ
]
+ σ2µ [bσµ − bσµ]
= σ2Uk−1σµ(b− γσµ)(1− ρτ+1)
= σ2Uk−1σµa(1− ρτ+1).
Lemma 3 ∀k > 0, ∀τ ≥ 0, B(Mk,τ,1) = 0 ⇔ ρθ,µ = 0.
Proof: Using Lemma 1 and 2, we have ρθ,µ = 0 ⇒ numk,τ = 0. The reciprocal follows
from the fact that σµ > 0, σθ > 0, σ2Uk−1 > 0, ∀k > 0 and (1 − ρτ+1) > 0, ∀τ ≥ 0. Thus
numk,τ = 0 ⇒ ρθ,µ = 0.
Lemma 4 ∀k > 0, ∀τ ≥ 0, ∀τ ′ > 1, B(DIDMk,τ,1,τ ′) = 0 ⇔ numk,τ − numk,−τ ′ = 0.
Proof: This stems from the proof of Lemma 1.
Lemma 5 numk,−τ ′ = σµa(σ2Uk−1 − ρτ
′−1σ2Uk−τ ′ ).
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Proof:
numk,−τ ′ =
[
bσµ + γρτ
′−1σ2Uk−τ ′
] [
σ2µ + σ2Uk−1
]
−
[
bσµ + γσ2Uk−1
] [
σ2µ + ρτ
′−1σ2Uk−τ ′
]
= γρτ ′−1σ4Uk−τ ′ − γρτ
′−1σ4Uk−τ ′
+ σ2Uk−1σµ [b− γσµ]− ρτ
′−1σ2Uk−τ ′σµ [b− γσµ]
+ σ2µ [bσµ − bσµ]
= σµ(b− γσµ)(σ2Uk−1 − ρτ
′−1σ2Uk−τ ′ )
= σµa(σ2Uk−1 − ρτ
′−1σ2Uk−τ ′ ).
Lemma 6 σ2Ut =
1−ρ2t
1−ρ2 σ
2 + ρ2tσ2U0.
Proof: The result follows from Equation (38) in Chabé-Ferret (2015) with m1 = m2 = 0.
Lemma 7 ∀k > 0, ∀τ ≥ 0, ∀τ ′ > 1, B(DIDMk,τ,1,τ ′) = 0 ⇔ ρθ,µ = 0.
Proof: Using Lemma 4, 5 and 6, we have that:
numk,τ − numk,−τ ′ = σµa(ρτ ′−1σ2Uk−τ ′ − ρτ+1σ2Uk−1)
= σµa
(ρτ
′−1 − ρτ+1) σ
2
1− ρ2︸ ︷︷ ︸
B(τ,τ ′)
+ρ2(k−τ ′)
(
σ2U0 −
σ2
1− ρ2
)
(ρτ ′−1 − ρτ+1ρ2(τ ′−1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
C(τ,τ ′)

From this, we have that ρθ,µ = 0 or ρ = 0 ⇒ B(DIDMk,τ,1,τ ′) = 0.
Since σ2µ > 0 and σ2θ > 0, ∀k > 0, ∀τ ≥ 0, ∀τ ′ > 1, B(DIDMk,τ,1,τ ′) = 0 ⇒ either
ρθ,µ = 0 or ∀k > 0, ∀τ ≥ 0, ∀τ ′ > 1, A(k, τ, τ ′) = B(τ, τ ′) + ρ2(k−τ ′)C(τ, τ ′) = 0. To prove
the final result, it remains to be shown that condition A(k, τ, τ ′) = 0 only implies that
ρ = 0. Let’s assume that ρ 6= 0 and show that this yields to a contradiction. Fix τ and
τ ′ such that τ + 2 6= τ ′. A(k, τ, τ ′) as a function of k has at most one real root as long as
B(τ, τ ′) 6= 0 or C(τ, τ ′) 6= 0. So A(k, τ, τ ′) = 0, ∀k > 0 ⇒ B(τ, τ ′) = 0 and C(τ, τ ′) = 0.
But B(τ, τ ′) = 0 ⇒ ρ = 0 or τ + 2 = τ ′ or σ2 = 0, a contradiction (since σ2 > 0 by
assumption). This proves the result.
Lemma 8 ∀k > 0, ∀τ ≥ 0, ∀τ ′ > 1, B(DIDk,τ,τ ′) = 0⇔ Cov(Y 0i,k+τ , D∗i,k)−Cov(Y 0i,k−τ ′ , D∗i,k) =
0.
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Proof:
E[Y 0i,t|D∗i,k] = E[Y 0i,t] +
Cov(Y 0i,k+τ , D∗i,k)
Var(D∗i,k)
(
D∗i,k − E[D∗i,k]
)
E[Y 0i,t|Di,k = 1] = E[Y 0i,t] +
Cov(Y 0i,k+τ , D∗i,k)
Var(D∗i,k)
(
E[D∗i,k|D∗i,k ≥ 0]− E[D∗i,k]
)
E[Y 0i,t|Di,k = 1]− E[Y 0i,t|Di,k = 0] =
Cov(Y 0i,k+τ , D∗i,k)
Var(D∗i,k)
(
E[D∗i,k|D∗i,k ≥ 0]− E[D∗i,k|D∗i,k < 0]
)
The result follows because E[D∗i,k|D∗i,k ≥ 0]− E[D∗i,k|D∗i,k < 0] > 0.
Lemma 9 Cov(Y 0i,k+τ , D∗i,k)− Cov(Y 0i,k−τ ′ , D∗i,k) = −γA(k, τ, τ ′).
Proof:
Cov(Y 0i,t, D∗i,k) = Cov(µi + Ui,t, θi + γµi + γUi,k−1)
= bσµ + γCov(Ui,t, Ui,k−1)
= bσµ + γρ|t−k+1|σ2Umin{t,k−1}
= γ(ρτ+1σ2Uk−1 − ρτ
′−1σ2Uk−τ ′ ).
Using the definition of A(k, τ, τ ′) completes the proof.
Lemma 10 ∀k > 0, ∀τ ≥ 0, ∀τ ′ > 1, B(DIDk,τ,τ ′) = 0 ⇔ γ = 0 or ρ = 0.
Proof: From Lemma 8 and 9, we have γ = 0 or ρ = 0 ⇒ B(DIDk,τ,τ ′) = 0. Moreover,
∀k > 0, ∀τ ≥ 0, ∀τ ′ > 0, B(DIDk,τ,τ ′) = 0 ⇒ γ = 0 or ∀k > 0, ∀τ ≥ 0, ∀τ ′ > 0,
A(k, τ, τ ′) = 0. The same reasoning as in the proof of Lemma 7 shows that the second
condition on A(k, τ, τ ′) implies that ρ = 0. This proves the result.
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof: Lemma 3, 7 and 10 prove the result.
Proof of Theorem 2
Proof: Using the same line of reasoning as the proof of Theorem 1, but modifying it
accordingly, yields the following result: ∀k > 0, ∀τ ≥ 0, ∀τ ′ > 0, B(DIDk,τ,τ ′) = 0 ⇒
−γfAf (k, τ, τ ′), with:
Af (k, τ, τ ′) =
(
(ρτ ′ − ρτ ) σ
2
1− ρ2 + ρ
2(k−τ ′)
(
σ2U0 −
σ2
1− ρ2
)
(ρτ ′ − ρτρ2τ ′)
)
.
This proves the consistency of Symmetric DID when σ2U0 =
σ2
1−ρ2 .
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In order to derive the bias of DIDM, it is useful to rewrite D∗fi,k as a function of D∗i,k:
D∗fi,k = θ
f
i + γfY 0i,k
= θfi + γfµi(1− ρ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
θi
+ γfρ︸︷︷︸
γ
Y 0i,k−1 + γfvi,k
= D∗i,k + γfvi,k.
Following the line of the proof of Theorem 1, we have that B(DIDMk,τ,1,τ ′) = 0 ⇔
aσµA(k, τ, τ ′) + γfρτσ2(σ2µ + σ2Uk−1). When σ
2
U0 =
σ2
1−ρ2 , we have B(DIDMk,τ,1,τ ) = 0 ⇔
ρτ−1σ2
(
aσµ + γfρ(σ2µ + σ
2
1−ρ2 )
)
. This proves the result.
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B Parameter values used in the simulations
Table 2 – Parameters used for the Monte-Carlo simulations
RIP, long run RIP, short run HIP, long run HIP, short run
Trimming level 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Sample size 1000 1000 1000 1000
Number of periods 40 40 40 40
δ 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
d 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
a 8.83 8.83 8.83 8.83
b 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56
c -0.057 -0.057 -0.057 -0.057
βx -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
ρ 0.99 0.99 0.821 0.821
m1 -0.4 -0.4 0 0
m2 -0.1 -0.1 0 0
α¯ 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
c¯ 3 3 3 3
r 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
µ¯ 0 0 0 0
β¯ 0 0 0 0
x¯ 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3
σ2x 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
σ2µ 0 0 0.022 0.022
σ2β 0 0 0.00038 0.00038
σ2 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055
σ2c 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
σ2α 0 0 0 0
σµ,β 0 0 -0.002 -0.002
ρµ,c 0 0 0 0
ρµ,x 0 0 0 0
ρµ,α 0 0 0 0
ρβ,c 0 0 0 0
ρβ,x 0 0 0 0
ρβ,α 0 0 0 0
ρc,x 0 0 0 0
λ 0 0 0.6 0.6
σ2U0 σ
2
U∞ σ
2 σ2U∞ σ
2
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C Additional simulation results
31
Fi
gu
re
4
–
M
ea
n
bi
as
an
d
M
SE
of
m
at
ch
in
g
an
d
D
ID
in
ad
di
tio
na
ls
im
ul
at
io
ns
of
a
m
od
el
of
ea
rn
in
gs
dy
na
m
ic
s
an
d
se
le
ct
io
n
in
a
JT
P
l
l
l
l
5
10
15
20
25
30
D
at
e 
of
 s
el
f−
se
le
ct
io
n 
in
 th
e 
JT
P
Mean bias
−0.20−0.100.000.10
l
Sy
m
. D
ID
 M
at
ch
in
g 
no
t o
n 
pr
e−
tre
at
. o
ut
co
m
es
Sy
m
. D
ID
 M
at
ch
in
g 
on
 1
 p
re
−t
re
at
. o
ut
co
m
e
Sy
m
. D
ID
 M
at
ch
in
g 
on
 3
 p
re
−t
re
at
. o
ut
co
m
es
M
at
ch
in
g 
on
 1
 p
re
−t
re
at
. o
ut
co
m
e
M
at
ch
in
g 
on
 3
 p
re
−t
re
at
. o
ut
co
m
es
l
l
l
l
5
10
15
20
25
30
0.000.020.040.060.08
D
at
e 
of
 s
el
f−
se
le
ct
io
n 
in
 th
e 
JT
P
MSE (a
)
R
IP
–f
ul
li
nf
o–
sh
or
t
ru
n
l
l
l
l
5
10
15
20
25
30
D
at
e 
of
 s
el
f−
se
le
ct
io
n 
in
 th
e 
JT
P
Mean bias
−0.20−0.100.000.10
l
l
l
l
5
10
15
20
25
30
0.000.020.040.060.08
D
at
e 
of
 s
el
f−
se
le
ct
io
n 
in
 th
e 
JT
P
MSE
(b
)
R
IP
–l
im
ite
d
in
fo
–l
on
g
ru
n
l
l
l
l
5
10
15
20
25
30
D
at
e 
of
 s
el
f−
se
le
ct
io
n 
in
 th
e 
JT
P
Mean bias
−0.20−0.100.000.10
l
l
l
l
5
10
15
20
25
30
0.000.020.040.060.08
D
at
e 
of
 s
el
f−
se
le
ct
io
n 
in
 th
e 
JT
P
MSE
(c
)
H
IP
–f
ul
li
nf
o–
lo
ng
ru
n
l
l
l
l
5
10
15
20
25
30
D
at
e 
of
 s
el
f−
se
le
ct
io
n 
in
 th
e 
JT
P
Mean bias
−0.20−0.100.000.10
l
l
l
l
5
10
15
20
25
30
0.000.020.040.060.08
D
at
e 
of
 s
el
f−
se
le
ct
io
n 
in
 th
e 
JT
P
MSE (d
)
H
IP
–f
ul
li
nf
o–
sh
or
t
ru
n
l
l
l
l
5
10
15
20
25
30
D
at
e 
of
 s
el
f−
se
le
ct
io
n 
in
 th
e 
JT
P
Mean bias
−0.20−0.100.000.10
l
l
l
l
5
10
15
20
25
30
0.000.020.040.060.08
D
at
e 
of
 s
el
f−
se
le
ct
io
n 
in
 th
e 
JT
P
MSE
(e
)
H
IP
–B
ay
es
ia
n
up
da
te
–
lo
ng
ru
n
N
ot
e:
th
e
bi
as
of
bo
th
es
tim
at
or
s
is
es
tim
at
ed
τ
=
4
pe
ri
od
s
af
te
r
th
e
JT
P.
M
at
ch
in
g
an
d
D
ID
M
at
ch
in
g
on
pr
e-
tr
ea
tm
en
t
ou
tc
om
es
is
pe
rf
or
m
ed
us
in
g
Y
i,
k
−
1
as
a
co
nd
iti
on
in
g
va
ri
ab
le
,f
or
k
∈
{5
,1
0,
20
,3
0}
.
T
he
m
ea
n
bi
as
an
d
th
e
m
ea
n
sq
ua
re
d
er
ro
r
(M
SE
)
ar
e
ca
lc
ul
at
ed
th
an
ks
to
50
0
M
on
te
-C
ar
lo
re
pl
ic
at
io
ns
.
E
ac
h
sa
m
pl
e
co
nt
ai
ns
10
00
in
di
vi
du
al
s
w
ith
ro
ug
hl
y
10
0
to
20
0
pa
rt
ic
ip
an
ts
.
T
he
bi
as
is
es
tim
at
ed
us
in
g
LL
R
M
at
ch
in
g
on
th
e
pr
op
en
si
ty
sc
or
e
w
ith
a
bi
w
ei
gh
t
ke
rn
el
.
T
he
ba
nd
w
id
th
is
se
t
to
.1
5
an
d
th
e
tr
im
m
in
g
le
ve
li
s
se
t
to
.4
.
D
et
ai
ls
on
th
e
pa
ra
m
et
ri
za
tio
n
of
th
e
m
od
el
ca
n
be
fo
un
d
in
A
pp
en
di
x
B
.
32
